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Using a ¯rm-level dataset this paper investigates the impact of taxation on the decision of
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Controlling for ¯rm-speci¯c di®erences in the valuation of potential locations, the results
con¯rm signi¯cant e®ects of tax incentives, market size, and of labor cost on cross-border
location decisions. In accordance with Devereux and Gri±th (1998) we ¯nd that the
marginal tax rate has no predictive power for location decisions whereas e®ective average
and statutory tax rates exert signi¯cant e®ects. In particular, the statutory tax rate has
strong predictive power for the likelihood of direct investment holdings at a location. The
results indicate that an increase in the statutory tax rate by 10 percentage points reduces
the odds of observing some positive direct investment by approximately 20 %.
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Initiated by the study of Hartman (1984) several empirical studies have investigated the
in°uence of taxes on cross-border investments of multinational ¯rms. However, in most
studies the focus is on the level of investment and its distribution rather than on the
underlying location decisions. An exception is the seminal contribution by Devereux and
Gri±th (1998) who establish the signi¯cance of the average tax burden for the choice
of location of subsidiaries within Europe using ¯rm-level data for U.S. enterprises. The
scarcity of evidence on location decisions might be due to the fact that the corresponding
analysis cannot be done using aggregate FDI data, but requires data on individual cross-
border investments, which are usually di±cult to obtain. Only recently the Bundesbank
has made available for research its micro-level dataset for foreign direct investment, which
o®ers interesting opportunities to study international location decisions (see Lipponer,
2003, for a description of the dataset). The aim of the current paper is to use this new
and promising dataset in order to study empirically the location decisions of German
multinationals. More speci¯cally, the paper investigates the impact of taxation on the
decision of German multinationals to hold a foreign direct investment at a speci¯c location.
Furthermore, as questionnaires among executives emphasize the signi¯cance of statutory
tax rates as compared to e®ective tax rates (S¿rensen, 1992), the predictive power of
alternative indicators of taxing incentives is tested.
Controlling for ¯rm-speci¯c di®erences in the valuation of potential locations, the results
con¯rm signi¯cant adverse e®ects not only of the local tax burden but also of the local
labor cost on international cross-border location decisions. In accordance with Devereux
and Gri±th (1998) the marginal tax rate is shown to have no predictive power for location
decisions whereas e®ective average and statutory tax rates exert signi¯cant e®ects. In
particular, the statutory tax rate has a strong predictive power for the likelihood of directinvestment holdings at a location. The results indicate that an increase in the statutory
tax rate by 10 percentage points reduces the odds of observing some direct investment by
approximately 20 %. With regard to the labor cost variable the estimated impact suggests
that an increase in the labor cost by 10 U.S. $ reduces the odds of observing some direct
investment by about 30 %.
In order to test whether the more advanced degree of integration within the EU shows up
in an increased sensitivity to tax incentives, separate estimations have been carried out
for the European Union countries. While the results point to an increased sensitivity of
location decisions with regard to market size and labor cost, however, the tax incentives
show e®ects similar to those in the complete sample.Nicht technische Zusammenfassung
Ausgehend von Hartman (1984) haben zahlreiche empirische Studien den Ein°uss der
Besteuerung auf die grenzÄ uberschreitenden Investitionen multinationaler Unternehmen un-
tersucht. Allerdings legen nahezu alle Studien den Schwerpunkt auf das Niveau und die
Verteilung der DirektinvestitionsstrÄ ome, nicht aber auf die eigentlichen Standortentschei-
dungen. Eine der wenigen Ausnahmen ist der bekannte Beitrag von Devereux und Gri±th
(1998), wonach die e®ektive Durchschnittssteuerbelastung die Standortwahl U.S. amerikanis-
cher Unternehmen innerhalb Europas beein°usst.
Die geringe Zahl an empirischen Untersuchungen zu den Standortentscheidungen inter-
nationaler Unternehmen dÄ urfte zu einem guten Teil auf die hohen Datenerfordernisse
entsprechender Untersuchungen zurÄ uckzufÄ uhren sein. Solche Untersuchungen kÄ onnen nÄ amlich
nicht anhand aggregierter DirektinvestitionsstrÄ ome, sondern lediglich anhand von Firmen-
DatensÄ atzen erfolgen, in denen die einzelnen Investitionen dokumentiert sind. Einen fÄ ur
die Untersuchungen grenzÄ uberschreitender Standortentscheidungen besonders interessan-
ten Datensatz stellt die Deutsche Bundesbank fÄ ur Forschungszwecke zur VerfÄ ugung (siehe
Lipponer, 2003). Das vorliegende Papier zielt darauf ab, anhand dieses bislang wenig
genutzen Datensatzes die Standortentscheidungen deutscher multinationaler Unternehmen
zu untersuchen. Im Zentrum steht der Ein°uss der steuerlichen Bedingungen in den
GastlÄ andern auf die Standortentscheidungen. Zur Messung der steuerlichen Bedingungen
werden nicht nur die e®ektiven GrenzsteuersÄ atze und die von Devereux und Gri±th ent-
wickelten e®ektiven DurchschnittssteuersÄ atze, sondern auch die statutorischen SteuersÄ atze
herangezogen, deren Ein°uss regelmÄ a¼ig in Umfragen bestÄ atigt wird (S¿rensen, 1992).
Nach Kontrolle fÄ ur ¯rmen-spezi¯sche Unterschiede in der Standortbewertung belegen die
Ergebnisse nicht nur den Ein°uss der Besteuerung, sondern auch der Arbeitskosten auf
die Standortentscheidungen. In Ä Ubereinstimmung mit Devereux und Gri±th (1998) ergibtsich, dass der e®ektive Grenzsteuersatz keine ErklÄ arungskraft fÄ ur die Standortentschei-
dungen besitzt, dass aber die e®ektive Durchschnittssteuerbelastung und die statutorische
Steuerbelastung deutliche E®ekte ausÄ uben. Insbesondere der statutorische Steuersatz er-
weist sich als wichtige BestimmungsgrÄ o¼e von Standortentscheidungen. So zeigt sich, dass
ein Anstieg des statutorischen Steuersatzes um 10 Prozentpunkte die Chancen eines En-
gagements um ca. 20 % reduziert. Im Hinblick auf die Arbeitskosten wird deutlich, dass
ein Anstieg um 10 U.S. $ die Chancen eines Standortengagements um ca. 30 % verringert.
Um zu testen, ob sich mit der fortgeschrittenen Integration in Europa eine erhÄ ohte Sen-
sivitÄ at der Standortentscheidungen innnerhalb Europas ergeben hat, wurden ergÄ anzende
Spezi¯kationen getestet. Allerdings ist innerhalb der EU lediglich die SensitivitÄ at in Bezug
auf Arbeitskosten und MarktgrÄ o¼e erhÄ oht. 
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 Tax Incentives and the Location of FDI: Evidence from
a Panel of German Multinationals1
1 Introduction
Initiated by the study of Hartman (1984) several empirical studies have investigated the
in°uence of taxes on foreign direct investment (surveys are provided by Hines, 1997, 1999,
and de Mooij and Ederveen, 2003). However, in most studies the focus is on the volume
and distribution of FDI rather than on the underlying location decisions. One notable
exception is Bartik (1985) who shows that the corporate tax rate has a signi¯cant impact
on business location decisions within the U.S. A more recent study is Devereux and Gri±th
(1998) who establish the signi¯cance of the e®ective average tax rate for the choice of
location of subsidiaries within Europe using ¯rm-level data for U.S. enterprises.
The scarcity of evidence on the impact of taxation on location decisions might be due
to the fact that the corresponding analysis cannot be done using aggregate FDI data,
but requires data on individual cross-border direct investments, which are usually di±cult
to obtain. Only recently the Bundesbank has made available for research its micro-level
dataset for foreign direct investment, which o®ers interesting opportunities to study in-
ternational location decisions (see Lipponer, 2003). The aim of this paper is to use this
new and promising dataset in order to study empirically the location decisions of German
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1multinationals. More speci¯cally, the paper investigates the impact of taxation on the de-
cision of German multinationals to hold a direct investment at a speci¯c foreign location.
Furthermore, as questionnaires among executives emphasize the signi¯cance of statutory
tax rates as compared to e®ective tax rates (e.g., S¿rensen, 1992), the predictive power of
alternative indicators of taxing incentives is tested.
Exploiting the panel-data features of the dataset in order to control for ¯rm-speci¯c di®er-
ences in the valuation of potential locations, the results con¯rm signi¯cant e®ects of labor
cost, market size, and tax incentives on international cross-border location decisions. In
accordance with Devereux and Gri±th (1998) we ¯nd that the marginal tax rate has no
predictive power for location decisions whereas e®ective average and statutory tax rates
exert strong e®ects.
The next section lays out the investigation approach. This is followed by a short description
of the data set. Another section presents the empirical results, before a ¯nal section draws
some conclusions.
2 Investigation Approach
Consider the location decision for the a±liate of a German multinational indexed by k.
With some positive probability pi;k this a±liate will be placed at location i. In the standard
view of tax competition location choice is regarded as an increasing function of expected
pro¯ts, which in turn are determined by taxes ¿i and other local conditions xi. If the choice
set is large this can be formalized as
pi;k = f (¼k (¿i;xi));
2where xi is a vector of local characteristics and ¼k represents expected pro¯ts in the view
of ¯rm k. The current investigation basically employs a sample of multinationals in order
to estimate a linearized version of this relationship
pi;k = yk® + ¿i¯ + °i + xi± + ²i;k;
where ²i;k is a residual variable. Note that in this simple speci¯cation ¯rm-speci¯c e®ects, as
captured by yk®, are assumed to be orthogonal to the location characteristics, as captured
by ¿i¯ +°i +xi±. However, despite this simpli¯cation, the pure cross-sectional tax e®ect ¯
is basically unidenti¯ed since the impact of taxes and of known characteristics xi is already
encompassed by the location-speci¯c or country e®ects °i. But, if one is willing to assume
that unobserved local determinants of location choice are time-invariant, and if there is
some variation in tax incentives over time, a possible solution is to pool observations for
di®erent periods and to estimate the tax equation using panel data. Accordingly, the
empirical analysis might be concerned with the relationship
pi;k;t = yk® + ¿i;t¯ + °i + xi;t± + Át + ²i;k;t; (1)
where Át is a time-speci¯c e®ect. Note that the panel data structure considered here is
the pooling of investment decisions across countries and time. Given the assumption that
¯rm e®ects are orthogonal to location as well as time e®ects, in this setting the presence of
¯rm-level panel data only helps to control for some di®erences between companies and to
solve aggregation problems but not to discriminate taxation e®ects from unknown location
characteristics.
However, given the availability of ¯rm-level panel data, the assumption that ¯rm e®ects
are orthogonal to location e®ects is overly restrictive. An alternative approach would allow
for ¯rm-speci¯c location e®ects. Intuitively, this approach would assume that each ¯rm
3has some idiosyncratic valuation of locations. Identi¯cation of tax and other locational
characteristics is then only possible using the variation of those characteristics over time
within each ¯rm-location cell. Formally, estimation would then require to allow for a full
set of ¯rm-location or ¯rm-country e®ects °i;k
pi;k;t = yk® + ¿i;t¯ + °i;k + xi;t± + Át + ²i;k;t: (2)
In principle, standard panel data estimation techniques might be used to estimate this
relationship. But, the inclusion of individual e®ects is not straightforward in the current
setting due to the binary nature of the observed dependent variable (¯rm k either holds an
investment at i or not). Some ¯rms will hold an investment at a speci¯c location during
all periods; other ¯rms will not hold an investment at this location in any period. Thus,
¯rm-speci¯c location e®ects will perfectly predict the outcome in these two cases. As a
consequence, appropriate estimators such as the ¯xed-e®ects logit approach proposed by
Chamberlain (1984) focus on a ¯rm's investment in a country only if we observe some
changes in location decisions over time.
3 Dataset
The empirical analysis basically uses the micro database for FDI provided by the German
Bundesbank. This is a comprehensive annual database of direct investment positions of
German enterprises held abroad as well as of direct investment positions held in Germany
by foreign companies. A favorable characteristic of the dataset is the possibility to trace the
direct investment positions of individual ¯rms over time. In this study we utilize ¯rm-level
panel data for the period 1996 to 2001.
4The collection of the data is enforced by German law, which determines reporting man-
dates for certain international transactions.2 With regard to outward FDI, each German
enterprise has to report its foreign assets, provided asset holdings are above some thres-
hold level. In the year 2000 some 8,500 domestic investors returned reports on their foreign
direct investment. In 2000 in the case of minority participations (greater 10 % and lower
50 %) reporting is mandatory if the balance sheet total of the direct investment exceeds 5
million euros; in the case of majority participations, direct investments have to be reported
if their balance sheet total is above 0.5 million euro. The database also contains indirect
FDI relations, which must be reported if a direct investment enterprise held by a majority
participation holds 10% or more of another enterprise.
A problem with the data is that threshold levels vary over time (see Lipponer, 2003). More
speci¯cally, as compared to the year 2000 in the considered time period they tend to be
lower in previous years. In order to make sure that the results are not subject to some
bias originating in the resulting panel attrition, the current study consistently employs a
uniform threshold level at which observations are included in the sample. Hence, direct
investments are only included if the current investment position is above the threshold
following the de¯nition for the year 2000.3
Tax incentives are captured by statutory, e®ective marginal, and e®ective average tax rates
on investment in the corporate sector of the host country taken from Devereux, Gri±th, and
Klemm (2002). Note that Germany usually exempts earnings of German a±liates abroad.
Hence, the tax burden at the location of the a±liate is decisive from the point of view of
German companies. Given the short time period of the analysis most of other potential
location characteristics are probably captured by country e®ects. However, presumably
2x26 Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (Law on Foreign Trade and Payments) in connection with Aussen-
wirtschaftsverordnung (Foreign Trade and Payment Regulations).
3While the uniformity of threshold levels across years proved important, note that variations in the
de¯nition of the threshold level have been found to have only minor e®ects on the estimation results.
5time-variant location conditions such as market sizes and labor cost are captured by OECD
data on GDP and hourly labor cost as provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics at the
U.S. Department of Labor.
For our purposes we exclude FDI in the ¯nancial sector, since we are basically interested
in the tax e®ects on real investment decisions. We also exclude direct investments, which
are made in branches or partnerships, since in such cases other e®ective or statutory tax
rates apply as in the corporate sector.
Table (1) provides descriptive statistics of the dataset. Note that the number of observa-
tions re°ects the whole set of possible locations for each enterprize. More speci¯cally, for
each company in the dataset in a given year there are 15 separate observations indicat-
ing whether or not a positive foreign direct investment is held separately for each of the
countries considered.
4 Results
As discussed above the empirical analysis of location decisions involves the estimation of
location probabilities depending on location and ¯rm characteristics. The logarithm of
GDP is used as a proxy variable for the size of the foreign market, the logarithm of hourly
compensation of employees in manufacturing is used as an indicator of labor cost. As it is
very di±cult to account for other locational conditions like public services or agglomeration
e®ects we also include dummy variables for each country in the sample in order to control
for unobserved country characteristics. In order to further reduce the consequences of
heterogeneity in the sample on the results, we include dummy-variables for the legal status
of the mother as one of the few available characteristics of the German investor in the
dataset, unless we explicitly allow for individual ¯rm-e®ects in the estimations.
6Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Statutory tax rate .347 .084 .100 .532
E®ective marginal tax rate .224 .071 .066 .403
E®ective average tax rate .295 .074 .084 .469
GDP 1304.9 2221.9 70.31 10020
Labor cost in manuf. 16.76 5.21 4.54 27.2
Legal status of mother
Sole proprietor/partnership .185 .388 0 1
Stock corporation (AG, KGaA) .113 .317 0 1
Limited liability corporation (GmbH) .482 .500 0 1
Other corporations .219 .413 0 1
Dependent branches .001 .033 0 1
Reported foreign direct investments by country
France .334 .472 0 1
Netherlands .180 .384 0 1
Italy .179 .383 0 1
United Kingdom .235 .424 0 1
Ireland .022 .145 0 1
Greece .023 .149 0 1
Portugal .047 .212 0 1
Spain .169 .374 0 1
Sweden .064 .244 0 1
Finland .022 .148 0 1
Austria .238 .426 0 1
Belgium .118 .322 0 1
USA .326 .469 0 1
Canada .072 .258 0 1
Japan .051 .220 0 1
424635 observations representing the possible holdings of foreign direct investments at 15
di®erent locations for 7423 ¯rms in the period 1996 to 2001.
7Table 2: Results: Linear Probability Model
method OLS OLS OLS
Statutory tax rate -.051 ?
(.025)
Marginal e®. tax rate -.005
(.014)
E®. average tax rate -.032
(.022)
log GDP .027 .015 .024
(.012) (.011) (.011)




R2 .1040 .1040 .1040
Dummies for country, time, and legal status of mother included. Standard errors (in
parentheses) robust against heteroscedasticity and random ¯rm e®ects. A star denotes
signi¯cance at the 10 % level.
Table (2) shows the results of a basic linear regression of the probability of holding a direct
investment in each of 12 major countries of the European Union, in the U.S., in Canada or
in Japan, on three di®erent tax measures, namely the e®ective marginal tax rate (EMTR),
the e®ective average tax rate (EATR, calculated at a rate of return of 10 %) and the
statutory tax rate (STR). In order to avoid the Moulton (1990) problem, standard errors
are robust against random ¯rm e®ects using the usual Huber-White sandwich formula.
The three indicators of the tax burden show di®erent results. While the marginal and
e®ective average tax rates prove insigni¯cant, the statutory tax rate shows a signi¯cant
negative impact. However, GDP proves insigni¯cant as well, and labor cost even show
an unexpected positive impact. Quantitatively, the estimated impact of the statutory tax
rate suggests that an increase of the statutory tax rate by 10 percentage points reduces the
probability to observe a foreign direct investment by about 0.51 percentage points: given
an average sample probability of 0.13 this is a relative reduction by 4 %.
The linear probability model fails to take account of the binary nature of the dependent
8variable. Making speci¯c assumptions about the probability distribution of the presence
of a direct investment conditional on covariates more e±cient estimates can be obtained
from corresponding non-linear estimators such as probit or logit. Table 3 provides results.
The ¯rst panel reports results from probit, the second from random-e®ects probit and the
third panel reports results from logit models. All estimates report robust standard errors.
Now, both the statutory as well as the e®ective average tax rate prove signi¯cant. With
regard to the marginal probability e®ects, quantitatively, the results on the tax rates are
quite similar as in the linear model. However, some estimates con¯rm the unexpected
positive coe±cient on the labor cost, and the estimations without random e®ects tend to
support a signi¯cant impact of GDP. While the random e®ects probit estimation shows
somewhat weaker results, the logit estimates yield almost identical marginal e®ects to the
probit model.
Given the strong signi¯cance of GDP and, partly, of labor cost in other studies of FDI
(e.g., Pain, 2003, or Billington, 1999) its insigni¯cance points to the di±culty to distinguish
country characteristics from the country-¯xed e®ects. However, as suggested above, the
¯rm-level data allow us to take account of ¯rm-speci¯c valuations of the attractiveness of
locations by means of ¯rm-speci¯c country e®ects. As these e®ects would perfectly predict
decisions if a ¯rm holds a direct investment or does not hold any direct investments during
the whole reporting period at a speci¯c location, we restrict attention to those observations
where a change in the location decision for each ¯rm-country cell is observed at least once in
the period analyzed. Table 4 provides results from a corresponding linear probability model
allowing for ¯rm-speci¯c country e®ects. Note ¯rst that the number of observations is
drastically reduced which re°ects the removal of all observations where a direct investment
position is or is not observed for a ¯rm in the total time period considered. As most of
the ¯rm-country-cells report zero investments the reduced sample shows a much higher
average probability to observe a direct investment (0.51 as compared to 0.13 in the basic
9Table 3: Results: Discrete Probability Models
Probit
Coe±cient Slope Coe±cient Slope Coe±cient Slope
Statutory tax rate -.263 ? -.047 ?
(.109) (.019)
Marginal e®. tax rate -.043 -.008
(.060) (.011)
E®. average tax rate -.187 ? -.033 ?
(.101) (.018)
log GDP .193 ? .034 ? .130 .023 .189 ? .034 ?
(.110) (.020) (.113) (.020) (.114) (.020)
log Labor cost in manuf. .035 .006 .044 .008 .042 .007
(.040) (.007) (.040) (.007) (.040) (.007)
Log-Likelihood -147772 -147773 -147772
Pseudo R2 .1349 .1349 .1349
Dummies for country, time, and legal status of mother included. Standard errors (in parentheses)
robust against heteroscedasticity and random ¯rm e®ects.
Probit with Random E®ects
Coe±cient Slope Coe±cient Slope Coe±cient Slope
Statutory tax rate -.307 ? -.042 ?
(.162) (.022)
Marginal e®. tax rate -.050 -.007
(.101) (.014)
E®. average tax rate -.220 -.030
(.153) (.021)
log GDP .225 .031 .153 .021 .223 -.030
(.150) (.020) (.155) (.021) (.157) (.021)
log Labor cost in manuf. .041 .006 .050 .007 ? .048 .007 ?
(.050) (.007) (.049) (.007) (.049) (.007)
Log-Likelihood -134408 -134409 -134408
Dummies for country and time included. Standard errors (in parentheses).
Logit
Coe±cient Slope Coe±cient Slope Coe±cient Slope
Statutory tax rate -.482 ? -.042 ?
(.193) (.017)
Marginal e®. tax rate -.108 -.009
(.105) (.009)
E®. average tax rate -.377 ? -.033 ?
(.180) (.016)
log GDP .402 ? .035 ? .301 .026 .421 ? .037 ?
(.222) (.019) (.229) (.020) (.231) (.020)
log Labor cost in manuf. .077 .007 .091 .008 .088 .008 ?
(.073) (.006) (.073) (.006) (.073) (.006)
Log-Likelihood -147872 -147874 -147873
Pseudo R2 .1343 .1343 .1343
Dummies for country, time, and legal status of mother included. Standard errors (in parentheses)
robust against heteroscedasticity and random ¯rm e®ects.
10Table 4: Results: Linear Probability Model with Firm-Speci¯c Country E®ects
method OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE
Statutory tax rate -.479 ?
(.187)
Marginal e®. tax rate -.019
(.118)
E®. average tax rate -.301 ?
(.177)
log GDP .339 ? .175 .315
(.188) (.193) (.196)
log Labor cost in manuf. -.125 ? -.111 ? -.113 ?
(.059) (.058) (.059)
Firm country cells 4789
Obervations 24528
Hausman ¯xed vs. random 40.0 (8) 33.1 (8) 35.8 (8)
Estimation with ¯xed e®ects for each ¯rm-country cell. Time-speci¯c e®ects included.
Standard errors (in parentheses).
sample). While statutory and e®ective average tax rates show signi¯cant negative e®ects
the marginal e®ective tax rate, again, proves insigni¯cant. The GDP now shows signi¯cant
positive e®ects and the labor cost variable no longer shows the unexpected positive sign
but shows a signi¯cant negative e®ect.
Quantitatively, the estimated impact of the statutory tax rate seems much larger than
in the previous estimations suggesting that an increase of the statutory tax rate by 10
percentage points reduces the probability to observe a direct investment by about 4.8
percentage points. Given the higher sample probability to observe a direct investment, the
relative reduction in the probability is about 9.4 % which is roughly twice as large than
in the basic estimations. Also the impact of the e®ective average tax rate is increased: an
increase by 10 percentage points reduces the probability to observe a direct investment by
5.9 %. Despite of its smaller coe±cient, the standard error of the e®ective average tax rate
is not much smaller, indicating that the estimate is less precise. However, it has to be noted
that the EATR assumes a speci¯c rate of return, which may not be representative for all
11Table 5: Results: Discrete Probability Model with Firm-Speci¯c Country E®ects
method Logit-FE Logit-FE Logit-FE
Statutory tax rate -1.98 ?
(.764)
Marginal e®. tax rate -.074
(.479)
E®. average tax rate -1.25 ?
(.724)
log GDP 1.41 ? .735 1.31
(.775) (.798) (.809)
log Labor cost in manuf. -.516 ? -.457 ? -.468 ?
(.241) (.240) (.240)
Firm country cells 4789
Obervations 24528
Log-Likelihood -9638 -9641 -9639
Estimation with ¯xed e®ects for each ¯rm-country cell. Time-speci¯c e®ects included.
Standard errors (in parentheses).
location decisions or all ¯rms in general. Thus, the smaller coe±cient is likely indicative
of a measurement error problem. With regard to the labor cost the results from the ¯rst
speci¯cation using the statutory tax rate indicate that a doubling of the labor cost reduces
the probability to observe a direct investment by 12.5 percentage points. Evaluated at
the mean level of labor cost in the sample of 16.8 U.S. $ per hour, this indicates that an
increase in the labor cost by 10 U.S. $ would result in a relative reduction of the location
probability by about 14.6 %.
Now, the linear probability model neglects the presence of a qualitative dependent variable.
Table 5 reports results from the ¯xed-e®ects logit model. Qualitatively, the results con¯rm
the ¯ndings from the linear model. The signs of the coe±cients are the same, and also
the signi¯cance against zero e®ects is con¯rmed. The interpretation is, however, slightly
di®erent, as the coe±cients report the impact on the log odds ratio. Hence, an increase of
the statutory tax rate by 10 percentage points reduces the odds of an investment by about
20 %. With regard to the labor cost we ¯nd that doubling the labor cost reduces the odds
12Table 6: Results: Discrete Probability Model with Firm-Speci¯c Country E®ects, EU
countries only
method Logit-FE Logit-FE Logit-FE
Statutory tax rate -1.94 ?
(.793)
Marginal e®. tax rate -.053
(.486)
E®. average tax rate -1.17
(.741)
log GDP 1.54 ? 1.01 1.54 ?
(.890) (.938) (.932)
log Labor cost in manuf. -.785 ? -.706 ? -.735 ?
(.332) (.329) (.330)
Firm country cells 3896
Obervations 19907
Log-Likelihood -7822 -7825 -7824
Estimation with ¯xed e®ects for each ¯rm-country cell. Time-speci¯c e®ects included.
Standard errors (in parentheses).
by about 50 %. In terms of the above example of an increase in the labor cost by 10 US $
the odds would fall by about 30 %.
The 15 countries selected are quite heterogenous, including EU member states as well as {
from a German perspective { rather distant locations such as U.S., Canada, and Japan. It
seems quite likely that tax incentives and other locational conditions have a di®erent impact
at least for these two subsets of countries. Table 6 reports results only for the location
decision within the EU. As compared to the estimations for the full sample, while the tax
rate e®ects are similar, the sensitivity with regard to GDP and labor cost is increased.
However, partly re°ecting the smaller sample the standard errors are increased as well.
135 Conclusions
The aim of the paper is to test empirically the in°uence of taxation on the decision of Ger-
man multinationals to hold a foreign direct investment at a speci¯c location. In di®erence
to most of the literature this paper uses a ¯rm-level dataset to study location decisions.
While this raises di±culties in combining data at the ¯rm as well as at the country level, it
enhances possibilities to identify tax incentives relative to other possibly unknown country
characteristics. Furthermore, as questionnaires among executives emphasize the signi¯-
cance of statutory tax rates as compared to e®ective tax rates, the predictive power of
alternative indicators of taxing incentives is tested.
The analysis ¯rst of all documents the di±culties to identify tax incentives and other
locational characteristics against simple location or country e®ects. While supporting an
impact of the statutory tax rate, basic regressions yield mixed and partly unexpected results
for control variables such as labor cost and GDP even if the non-linearities arising from
the binary dependent variable are taken into account. Only when allowing for ¯rm-speci¯c
valuation of a country's attractiveness, signi¯cant e®ects can be established not only for
statutory tax rates but also for the e®ective average tax rate, the market size, as captured
by the GDP, and the labor cost. The results indicate that an increase in the statutory tax
rate by 10 percentage points reduces the odds to observe some positive direct investment
by approximately 20 %; for the e®ective average tax rate the corresponding ¯gure is 12.5
%. With regard to the labor cost variable the estimated impact suggests that an increase
in the labor cost by 10 U.S. $ per hour reduces the odds to observe an investment by about
30 %.
In conditioning on ¯rm-speci¯c country e®ects the sample is, however, considerably reduced
and attention is focused on those multinationals which are revealed to alter their location
14decisions in the six-year period considered. Thus, the stronger results for this sub-sample
are likely caused by a larger fraction of footloose industries and, in this respect, may not
be representative for all German multinationals.
In order to test whether the more advanced degree of integration within the EU shows up
in an increased sensitivity to tax incentives, separate estimations have been carried out
for the European Union countries. While the results point to an increased sensitivity of
location decisions with regard to market size and labor cost, however, the tax incentives
show e®ects similar to those in the complete sample.
Among the di®erent indicators of tax incentives, the statutory tax rate has the strongest
predictive power and yields the strongest e®ects. In contrast, the marginal e®ective tax
rate is not signi¯cant at all. Given the signi¯cance of the e®ective average tax rate this is in
accordance with Devereux and Gri±th (1998) who argue that the e®ective average rather
than the marginal tax rate matters for location decisions. However, one could speculate
whether the weaker predictive power of the e®ective average tax rate as compared to the
statutory tax rate may indicate that uncertainties in the rate of return or in the applicability
of certain deductions lead investors to rely on the statutory tax rate. But it also could
simply re°ect di®erences in the rate of return of investment projects which might give rise
to a measurement error problem.
Datasources and De¯nitions
Firm-level data are taken from the micro-dataset of the Bundesbank, see Lipponer
(2003) for an overview.
GDP in U.S. Dollars, nominal. Source: OECD.
Hourly compensation of workers: Hourly compensation costs in U.S. Dollars for pro-
duction workers in manufacturing. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
15Tax incentives are taken from Devereux, Gri±th, and Klemm (2002). The data are
kindly provided by the authors at the IFS website.
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